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In this paper we evaluate in monetary terms the beneﬁts from attending a post-secondary
degree in an Italian university. We also propose a microsimulation model that takes into
account the spatial distribution of scholarships, fees and other monetary and in-kind services
related to the university sector. In this way, it is possible to obtain a good approximation
of the real net beneﬁt gained from attending a post-secondary Italian degree and to study
its distributive impact on both the users and the whole Italian population. We will provide
evidence that the beneﬁts from public higher education have universalistic features. How-
ever, the tax-system that is applied by each university is slightly regressive whilst subsidies
have a high potential in terms of redistribution, even though the allocated funds are not
enough to create any signiﬁcant eﬀect. Given these results, a new tax-policy is proposed to
overcome some of the problems of the present system.
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ition fees, subsidy.
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1 Introduction
According to the traditional economic categories, higher education cannot be deﬁned as a public
good since it is a service that can be excludable and often competing. However, public regulation
is still necessary for both eﬃciency and equity reasons. As far as eﬃciency is concerned, a
non-regulated market for higher education would create problems of certiﬁcations, asymmetric
information and externalities. Yet, it has become a tradition to invoke equity reasons to justify
the pubic intervention in this sector. In general, the problem of ﬁnancing tertiary education is
1closely related to the reasons of public intervention. Indeed, given the nature of human capital
investment that characterises higher education, a cost-sharing policy would be economically
eﬃcient. More speciﬁcally, public funds should pay only for the costs of producing pure public
goods (i.e. the cost of producing positive externalities) whilst the other part of expenditure has
to be paid by users. Therefore, fees seem as the natural instrument that should be used for this
purpose, whilst equity reasons justify levels of fees that can be diﬀerentiated according to the
economic condition of each user1.
In this paper we will focus on the distributive eﬀects of such a cost-sharing policy by explicitly
taking into account the full set of tax-beneﬁt institutes that characterise the Italian university
sector, which are mainly based on fees and scholarships. This kind of analysis is innovative for
the Italian case, given the extremely high heterogeneity that characterises the tax-beneﬁt policies
adopted in each university and the lack of available microdata.
The most recent paper that analyses the distributive impact of providing tertiary education
services is from Sonedda and Turati [2005]. Previous studies are from Citoni [2001] and Brandolini
et al. [1998]. All of these papers are based on the Survey on Household Income and Wealth
(SHIW) conducted every two years by the Bank of Italy. Given data constraints, these authors
base their analysis on the average cost per user. This technique is widespread whenever the
aim is the evaluation of services oﬀered by public administrations and there are not substitute
markets2.
Brandolini et al. [1998] and Citoni [2001] use the 1993 survey. They do not consider any
ﬁnancial or in-kind support such as scholarships, free meals, or housing services, while the amount
of fees is directly reported in the survey. Sonedda and Turati [2005] base their analysis on 2001
data. They do not consider ﬁnancial aid or in-kind services either. Moreover, fees are considered
as a one-oﬀ annual cost represented by the average fee per user paid in each Italian region, a
technique that actually does not consider the progressivity of the fee scheme. Nevertheless, given
the increasing importance of fees and other ﬁnancial and in-kind aids, it is becoming important
to create more sophisticated simulation models that are able to consider these aspects. Thus,
the aim of this paper is to propose a tax-beneﬁt microsimulator that allows taking explicitly into
account the spatial heterogeneity of both beneﬁts and fees. In this way, it is possible to evaluate
in great detail the distributive impact of the policies adopted by the Italian university institutes.
The paper is structured as follows. In the ﬁrst section we compare the Italian university
policies with others from a selection of European countries. Section two presents the simulation
model and compares it with the previous studies. Sections three to ﬁve describe the model.
Section six presents the distributive analysis. Section seven proposes a tax reform and compares
it with the actual system. Section eight concludes.
1As it will clariﬁed later, the aforementioned system has been applied in the case of Italy although there are
signiﬁcant diﬀerences across European countries.
2The most important problem with this approach is that it does not consider the diﬀerence between the
marginal cost and the marginal beneﬁt due to the ineﬃciency of public production. Moreover, this approach does
not allow to account for diﬀerences in quality.
22 Tax-beneﬁt policies for higher education in Europe
The European Union presents a high heterogeneity in the policies for university students. Table
1c o n t a i n sas u m m a r yo ft h eo u t - o f - p o c k e tp o l i c i e sa d o p t e di ns o m eE u r o p e a nc o u n t r i e s :
Table 1. Tuition fees for undergraduate courses. Academic year 2004/2005
Countries Min fee (€)M a x F e e ( €)D e s c r i p t i o n






Germany 0 +€1000 if out-of-course student
France 150 300 Varying in each university.
Spain 480 850 Varying in each Autonomous
Community
Portugal 463 852 Varying in each university
The Netherlands 0 1505 Fixed
Greece 0 +€1400-3000 if out-of-course
student
Italy 0 1500 Varying in each university - it
depends on a means test
Source: Eurybase, 2005; CHEPS, 2003b; Jongbloed, 2004; Miur, 2005
As it can be seen from the table, cost-sharing policies are widespread in Europe. Apart from
the Northern countries, Greece and Germany, all the other countries considered here use some
form of cost-sharing policies, although they are not homogeneous. Indeed, some countries adopt
a ﬁxed fee deﬁned by the national government (Austria, Ireland and the Netherlands), while
others deﬁne a maximum fee and allow each university to diﬀerentiate that amount.
However, it is worth noting that the system of fees cannot be evaluated without its counter-
part, that is the system of ﬁnancial and in-kind subsidies. The next graph shows the maximum
subsidy received in each of the European country considered above. Importantly, we have ordered
these countries taking into account another important criterion, i.e. the percentage of students
who receive any kind of monetary aid. As the graph shows, among these European countries
the most common subsidy is the scholarship for low-income users. The Northern countries oﬀer
high subsidies to the majority of students by means of a diversiﬁcation of the subsidy between
loans and scholarships. Italy, among the others, has the lowest percentage of recipients and has
also a relatively low import of the monthly scholarship. In general, from the graph below we
can also see that the monetary beneﬁts do not diﬀer only according to their type but also (and
3signiﬁcantly) according to their amount.
Graph 1. Maximum monthly subsidy by type and amount plus percentage of recipients
Source: Eurybase [2006]; CHEPS [2003]; Vossensteyn Hans [2004 e 2006], Schwarz S., Reheburh M.
[2004]; HIS [2006].
3 The simulation model, general results and comparisons
The simulation model presented in this paper is based on the 2002 survey of the Bank of Italy
[SHIW 2002]. Among all the possible available databases, this meets our purposes since it
contains information on both the economic condition of the Italian households and the main
activity of each individual. Using this latter information along with the variable on the last
degree obtained, it is possible to identify the people who are more probably using the university
service3.
We construct our simulation over the more general microsimulation model Mapp02 [Baldini
2004]. The main reason is that Mapp02 contains many tax and beneﬁt simulators that are useful
for our policy analysis. In particular, Mapp02 is able to simulate most of the Italian tax-beneﬁt
system: all direct and indirect taxes, pensions and most of the monetary beneﬁts. Moreover,
Bosi, Baldini and Paciﬁco [2008] presented an extended version of Mapp02 that is able to take
into account most of the in-kind beneﬁts that characterise the Italian welfare state, namely health
and education. In this paper we use a deﬁnition of starting income distribution that takes into
account all these possible public instruments but for in-kind beneﬁts. The idea is to consider the
full set of possible monetary interventions in order to compute an income distribution as closer
as possible to the real one.
3This way of identifying the recipients has evident drawbacks since it might append that people who deﬁne
themselves as students do not actually attend lectures or take exams, a phenomenon quite common in Italy.
However, it is also probable that who deﬁne himself as a student does actually pay the university fees, which is
what matters for our distributive analysis.
4Starting from this income vector, we ﬁrstly add the gross beneﬁt from higher education, which
is computed in terms of the cost of production per user, excluding out-of-pocket revenues and
other additional cost that are spent to provide eligible students with subsidies and other monetary
and in-kind beneﬁts. This allows us to analyse the changes in the distribution of income when
this gross beneﬁt is considered or, from another perspective, to identify winners and losers from
the pure distribution of public expenditures in higher education. The analysis will show that the
gross beneﬁt reduces income inequality even though the transfer is, on average, pro-rich. When
fees and subsidies are considered, the redistributive impact slightly increases although this is due
only to the eﬀect of scholarships and other beneﬁts, since the system of fees and other taxes
turns out to be regressive.
The evidence provided in this paper can be compared with other Italian studies on the
distributive impact of the university sector. We can ﬁnd diﬀerences and similarities. Regarding
the similarities, our analysis shows a beneﬁt that is more concentrated on the highest percentiles
of the income distribution. However, we do not ﬁnd such a high correlation between disposable
income and beneﬁts from higher education as in Brandolini et al. [1998] or Citoni [2000]. This
discrepancy can be attributed to several reasons4. In particular, it is plausible that the demand
for higher education has changed in a great degree over a decade. In support of this statement,
the next graph compares for each decile of equivalent disposable income the percentage of Italian
households that more probably demand university services in 2002 and in 19955.
4Brandolini et al. [1998] ﬁnd that the Gini index is reduced when higher education beneﬁts are taken into
account. Instead, we ﬁnd that the Gini index slightly increases.
5The disposable income is the income after direct taxes, monetary beneﬁts and pensions. We make use of the
OCSE equivalence scale.
5Graph 2.P e r c e n t a g eo fh o u s e h o l d st h a td e m a n dh i g h e re d u c a t i o ns e r v i c e s
for each decile of equivalent disposable income.
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Source: Our elaborations based on ‘95 and ‘02 SHIW data.
The graph demonstrates that between 1995 and 2002 the distribution of users from diﬀerent
income percentiles has became more equal. However, the graph has to be interpreted care-
fully. It does not imply that rich households have decreased their demand for higher education,
but it rather shows that the distribution of the demand is less concentrated on higher income
households. For example, it might be the case that households from the left tail of the income
distribution have increased their demand6.
Another reason that might explain the possible diﬀerences between our ﬁndings and previous
evidence could be related to the equivalence scales. Equivalence scales are necessary in any
distributive analysis since they take into account the return to scale produced when more people
share part of their ﬁxed costs (bills, rent, etc.). However, the use of equivalence scales signiﬁcantly
modiﬁes the income distribution as they shift large households towards its left tail. Moreover,
large households are more likely to use educational services, so that the distributive eﬀect of
educational services depends in part on the equivalent scale7. In their analyses, both Citoni
[2000] and Brandolini et al. [1998] are well-aware of this problem. In particular, both papers
show that the distributive eﬀect of higher education is lower with respect to other in-kind beneﬁts
when these are evaluated without using equivalence scales.
As for the paper of Sonedda and Turati [2005], they present results more in line with our
ﬁndings and, as we will discuss later, the diﬀerences may be due to diﬀerent simulation techniques.
6As Bratti et al. [2008] and Lucifora et al [2008] point out, many universities have increased the number of
branches in smaller towns, which have - on average - a lower disposable income.
7Baldini et al. [2004] have shown that diﬀerent equivalent scales change in a diﬀerent manner the equivalent
income distribution.
64 The simulation of gross beneﬁts from attending tertiary
education
A well-known problem of the evaluation of goods and services produced outside the market is the
impossibility of using prices as a proxy for the evaluation of the willingness to pay (and hence
of the utility of consumption). The problem is even more complicated when a parallel market
that oﬀers substitute goods and/or representative surveys on the willingness to pay for that
particular service does not exist. In this situation, there are few alternatives for the evaluation
of the monetary gain.
The most common technique is the evaluation in terms of cost of production per user. As-
suming that the public sector is able to produce a particular good with a technology that is closer
to the frontier, then it is probable that the marginal production cost is close to the marginal
beneﬁt gained by users. Obviously, this is not the case for the public sector, in particular for the
academic one. In general, the ineﬃciency associated with the public production and the absence
of competition among public universities are common examples for the failure of this evaluation
method.
Nevertheless, we still use this approach in our paper, given the lack of data that would allow
the use of diﬀerent techniques8. The data used in the present analysis mostly comes from the
National Centre for the Evaluation of the University System, which publishes online assets and
liability statements for each Italian public university. Since there is no information about the
students who are attending a private university, we used a matching method to recognise those
that are more likely to demand a private service and we did not impute any beneﬁt to these
matched units9.
In order to get the gross beneﬁt from higher education, we aggregated to a regional level
the 2003 expenditures of each university located in a particular region. Importantly, we isolated
the pure teaching expenditures from this total amount using administrative regional data on the
percentage of expenditure used for academic research10.
Once we compute the regional expenditure on didactics we divide this amount by the regional
number of students enrolled in the academic year 2002/2003. The result is a good approximation
of the average cost per recipient11. It is worth noting that we could have multiplied the number
of recipients by the percentage of eﬀective students since Italy has a high percentage of students
who are not on time with their studies or that do not fully attend their degree. This it would
8Another reason for our choice is the main aim of our analysis. Indeed, we focus on the eﬀects of the net
beneﬁt, not the gross one. Speciﬁcally, what it turns out to be interesting is the eﬀect of instruments like tuition
fees and scholarships rather than the eﬀect of the pure public cost per user.
9Since less than 6% of Italian students attended a private university in our reference year, results do not change
signiﬁcantly when these students are included among the recipients.
As for the matching procedure, we use the propensity score matching [Rosembaum and Rubin 1984] between
the 2002 and the 1993 surveys, as the latter is the only one that contains information on the consumption of
public services. Note that the matching has been implemented only among those households that use the service.
10The source of data is the government report “Universitá in cifre”. The report is available online, see Miur
[2005].
11Our analysis is focused on undergraduate and graduate students.
7have increased the per-capita transfer, but given the impossibility of distinguishing between
registered students and eﬀective students we did not adopt this strategy12. The amount so
obtained is regressed on a set of covariates using a median regression and the predicted values
are then imputed to each person who is identiﬁed as potentially enrolled to the university13.
Importantly, the beneﬁt obtained with this procedure has to be seen as a gross transfer.
Indeed, enrolment and tuition fees partially ﬁnance this beneﬁt and, at the same time, it does
not consider expenditures to produce in-kind services and/or to provide ﬁnancial aids to students.
Once these components are considered, we can deﬁne the corresponding beneﬁt as a net beneﬁt.
Unfortunately, evaluating fees and beneﬁts is complicated for many reasons. One reason
is the lack of available data that is necessary to better reproduce tax and subsidy functions.
Hence, assumptions and conjectures have to be made to simulate these instruments. Another
important reason is the high autonomy that the national law recognises to each single institute
in the determination of subsidies and fees. As an example, the national rules for the tuition fees
are very general. Hence, year-by-year, each university has developed its own system that makes
it diﬃcult to understand a common underlying process14.T h i ss i t u a t i o ni m p l i e st h a t ,i no r d e rt o
adequately reproduce the distribution of fees and subsidies to academics, each single university
has to be analysed separately. The next section presents an overview of the simulator for both
tuition fees and various subsidies that is able to capture most of this heterogeneity.
5 The criteria for the simulation of tuition fees and subsidies
Unfortunately, it is not easy to determine the university in which each student is enrolled from
the Bank of Italy database. Given the high heterogeneity among universities in the deﬁnition of
fees and subsidies, this lack of data is particularly binding.
As anticipated in the previous section, we assume that students who reside in a particular
region attend an institute located in the same region. Moreover, since there are often several
universities in the same region, we further assume that the student attends the biggest one. The
extent of this set of assumptions has to be considered properly since it might not be as strong
as it can be initially thought. Firstly, the universities we dealt with cover more than half of
the whole population of students. Secondly, we have noticed that the smaller universities of a
particular region tend to imitate the policies of the biggest ones. The graph below shows - for
each Italian region - the share of students enrolled in the universities we consider with respect
to the total number of students enrolled in the same region:
12See the book “L’Universitá truccata”, Perotti [2008].
13It is worth noting that this approach considers neither the diﬀerences in quality, nor the phenomenon of
the regional mobility. However, the problem of regional mobility in 2002/2003 is not a great limitation, as the
percentage of students who attend a degree in a region other than the one of residence is less than 6%. Aggregated
data on student mobility can be found online, see www.cnvsu.it for details. The results of the quantile regressions
can be found in the appendix.
14For the tuition fees the level of heterogeneity is surprisingly high. Each university has diﬀerent indicators
for the household economic condition, diﬀerent numbers of brackets, diﬀerent marginal taxes, diﬀerent criteria to
evaluate the students’ merit, etc.
8Graph 3. Percentage of students enrolled in the considered university with respect
the whole population of student enrolled in the same region.
Source: Own elaboration on administrative data.
As it can be seen, the error made with our assumptions is lowest in smaller regions and/or in
regions with a “dominant” university. However, the error increases in highly populated regions
and/or in regions with competitive universities. The table below contains the universities we are
considering for each region and the relative number of students:





Trentino AA Trento 14,510
Friuli V.G. Trieste 23,953
Liguria Genova 34,523
Emilia Romagna Bologna 101,.006
Toscana Florence 59,458
Umbria Perugia 33,336
Marche Ancona “Università Politecnica delle Marche” 14,450
Lazio Rome - "La Sapienza" 132,537
Abruzzi Chieti – “Gabriele D’Annunzio” 23,617
Molise Campobasso 9,068
Campania Napoli - "Federico II" 94,278
Puglia Bari 50,140
Basilicata Potenza 7,081
Calabria Arcavacata di Rende 29,193
Sicilia Palermo 62,262
Sardegna Cagliari 33,621
Source: Own elaboration on MIUR data.
9The simulation of the university fees has been done by analysing the relative local law for
each of the universities listed above. In what follows we summurise the general procedure and
the main assumptions we made to reproduce the local system of fees and subsidies.
To start with, it can be useful to put the stress on the common parameters that enter in the
fee functions. The two most important criteria are the household economic condition and its
number of members. These two elements explain most of the variations in the amount of fees
due. However, these factors are not unique. Each university has set its own criteria to deﬁne
the household economic condition and the way to take into account the number of people in the
same household. This has made the simulation cumbersome since we had to reproduce many
indicators for both15.
However, there are several other elements that enter the fee functions. For instance, the stu-
dent performance, the type of course, the department attended, the full-time/part-time condition
and whether the student is on time with his/her studies. Unfortunately, most of this information
is not in our database. Hence, we had to proceed using a set of assumptions and a system of
weights to consider all these aspects16.N o n e t h e l e s s ,i ti sw o r t hs t r e s s i n go u tt h a tt h e s ep a r a m -
eters are not so important in the simulation of the fee schemes. Indeed, none of the universities
above uses all of these parameters together. For instance, one university could take particularly
into account the students’ performance and another one the type of department attended, but it
is unusual that the same university uses both simultaneously. Moreover, none of these additional
parameters adds so much variation to the amount due17. In fact, what makes the diﬀerence in
the speciﬁc academic year considered in this paper are the indicator of the economic condition
and the scale of equivalence adopted. Fortunately, we have full control of these variables and we
could carefully reproduce the fees-functions applied in each of the 19 universities considered.
The simulation for the scholarships has been easier than the one for the fees. The reason is
an ad-hoc national law for their regulation18. The national law deﬁnes three criteria in order
to be eligible for a scholarship: the economic situation, the performance and the distance to
the university. Conditional on these parameters, the Italian law deﬁnes the minimum value for
the scholarship amount. Once again, we do not have information on both the student location
and his/her performance. To take into account the student location we made use of a system
of weights derived from administrative data on the number of students who live far from the
university19. In order to account for the students’ performance, we took into account all the
15The most common indicator is the ISEU (Indicatore della situazione economica per gli universitari). The
ISEU takes into account both the household income and its wealth. The other indicators we ﬁnd can be seen
as diﬀerent versions (or precursors) of the ISEU. For a full description of the ISE and the ISEU the interested
reader can read the paper “Quinto rapporto sullo stato di attuazione e sugli eﬀetti derivanti dall’applicazione
dell’indicatore della situazione economica” [2004].
16Most of the data used for the construction of the weights is from the CNVSU. The author is available for
further clariﬁcations about the procedure used for each single university.
17For example, having a delay in the graduation adds a very small penalty in the fees due when this parameter
is considered.
18See the d.p.c.m. 09-04-2001.
19The system of weights is diﬀerent for each region. The source of data is the “Osservatorio Regionale per il
Diritto allo studio del Piemonte”.
10possible information available in the database that could help predict it. In particular, we used
the high school ﬁnal examination mark and the number of years elapsing from the high school
graduation. Finally, in the simulation of scholarships we also considered the fact that in Italy
there is an increasing number of students who are eligible for a scholarship but that do not receive
it due to the lack of funds.
Given all these information, the distribution of scholarships is obtained through a minimum
distance algorithm that reproduces - for each region - the joint distribution of eligible students
and of eligible students who are without a scholarship20.F i n a l l y ,i ti sw o r t hn o t i n gt h a ts o m e
universities provide part of the scholarship in terms of in-kind beneﬁts. When this happens, we
add an estimate of the monetary value of the average in-kind transfer to the monetary part of
the scholarship21.
6 Simulation results
Before proceeding with the distributive analysis, it is worth making some comparisons between
the prediction of the simulator and the real data. In this exercise, we particularly focus on the
tuition fees and monetary beneﬁts for the academic year 2005/200622. To start with, in 2005 the
revenues from tuition and enrolment fees have been about 1.25 billion euros23. The simulator
produces revenues for about 1.29 billion euros, a value very close to the real one. Moreover, as
shown in the next graph, the distribution of students for each bracket of per-capita amount of
fees paid is deﬁnitely close to the simulated one:
20The joint distribution for each region is available online at the website of the institute “Osservatorio Regionale
per il Diritto allo studio del Piemonte”.
21To evaluate the monetary value of the in-kind beneﬁts we used an ad-hoc study about the cost of refectories:
“I costi di gestione del servizio di ristorazione: esperienze a confronto” Russo M. [2005]. For the housing services
we used the monetary value recognised to students who did not ﬁnd a place in the house of residence as a proxy
for the cost of providing a place in a residence. Most of the time, is the university itself that publishes online
both the scholarship amounts (with and without the in-kind beneﬁt).
22The year of the analysis is the 2005. We did not consider the budget data of the academic year 2002/2003
because the simulation of fees and beneﬁts has been based on the 2005/2006 rules (the only one which was fully
available online at the time we made the analysis). Thus, any monetary value of Mapp02 has been converted
in 2005 values using ISTAT weights. As long as the demand for higher education has not changed signiﬁcantly
between the 2003 and the 2005, the latter is the right year to validate the prediction of our simulator.
23Source: The Ministry of University, MIUR – Internal Bureau of Statistic [2006]. The amount does not consider
revenues from the so-called “tax for the right of studying” (“tassa per il diritto allo studio”) and considers fees
paid only by students from undergraduate and graduate degrees.
11Figure 5.D i s t r i b u t i o no fs t u d e n tc o n d i t i o n a lo nt h ep e r - c a p i t ac o n t r i b u t i o n .
Comparison between predicted and observed value.
Source: MIUR data and own elaboration on SHIW data.
Unfortunately, these kinds of comparisons are the only ones that can be made given the
scarcity of administrative data about university fees. For the simulation of the scholarships
we found a correlation of 0.8 with the variable that collects data on this type of earnings.
Moreover, thanks to the algorithm used in the computation of this distribution, the predicted
data reproduces well the distribution of eligible students and of those eligible students who are
without a scholarship. This clearly conﬁrms the success in the reproduction of the scholarship
functions24.
7 The distributive analysis of the Italian university system
The starting point of the analysis is an income distribution that takes into account monetary
beneﬁts (unemployment beneﬁts, maternity credits and other form of subsidies), pensions, direct
taxes and most of the indirect taxes. This is deﬁned as the real disposable income. Starting
from this income distribution, we precede by adding one by one the components of the higher
education beneﬁt. We ﬁrst add the gross beneﬁt, followed by the fees and ﬁnally the subsidies.
We analyse in detail the absolute variation of the Gini index – the Reynolds-Smolensky index
–u s i n gi t sd e c o m p o s i t i o ni n t ot h et h r e et y p i c a lc o m p o n e n t so fi n c i d e n c e ,p r o g r e s s i v i t ya n dr e -
ranking. The incidence part measures how much the instrument, i.e. the gross transfer, the fees,
the subsidies or the net transfer, is a burden to the starting deﬁnition of income (the ex-ante
distribution). The progressivity part measures the concentration of the instrument with respect
to the poorest percentiles of the starting deﬁnition of income. Finally, the re-ranking component
isolates the eﬀect of possible repositioning of units with respect to the starting sorting. The two
groups of interest are the whole Italian population and the sub-sample that actually demand
24We do not have enough information to evaluate the simulation results for other in-kind transfers such as free
meals and housing services.
12higher education services. The unit of analysis is the household. The OECD scale of equivalence
is applied to the disposable household income in order to take into account possible returns to
scale.
The following table shows the distributive impact of the University public sector with respect
to the equivalent disposable income for the whole Italian population:
Table 4. The distributive eﬀect of attending a post-secondary degree in a public University
Variabile Gini RS RS decomposition(*100) Conc.
Equivalent disposable income (y) 37261 Inc. Prog. Rer.
y+g r o s sb e n e ﬁ t 3 7 0 7 9 - 0 , 1 8 + 0 , 7 1 - 2 9 , 6 7 0 , 0 3 7 , 5 9
y-f e e sa n dt a x e s 3 7 2 7 7 + 0 , 0 2 - 0 , 2 - 8 , 6 0 , 0 2 8 , 6
y+s u b s i d i e s 3 7 2 1 5 - 0 , 0 5 + 0 , 1 - 9 5 , 9 0 , 0 - 5 8 , 6
y+n e tb e n e ﬁ t 3 7 0 4 1 - 0 , 2 2 + 0 , 6 0 - 4 1 , 0 8 0 , 0 2 - 3 , 8 2
Source: own elaboration on SHIW data, whole Italian population
As results show, the inequality in the equivalent disposable income corresponds to a Gini
value of 37.26. A reduction of -0.18 in the Gini index is observed once the gross university
beneﬁt is considered. Finally, if we consider also the fees and subsidies, we observe that the
former have a small regressive impact while the latter are slightly progressive. Considering the
whole (net) beneﬁt from higher education, we observe a reduction of 0.22 in the inequality. As it
can be seen from the last column, the concentration index of the gross beneﬁt is slightly positive
indicating a pro-rich transfer. Nevertheless, contrary to Brandolini et al. [1998], the beneﬁt is
still slightly redistributive25.
The next table shows the results for the sub-sample of households that actually demand the
service:
Table 5. The distributive eﬀect of attending a post-secondary degree in a public University.
Variabile Gini RS RS decomposition(*100) Conc.
Equivalent disposable income (y) 36377 Inc. Prog. Rer.
y+g r o s sb e n e ﬁ t 3 4 5 3 6 - 1 , 8 + 6 , 1 - 3 0 , 8 0 , 0 + 5 , 6
y-f e e sa n dt a x e s 3 6 5 1 1 + 0 , 9 - 1 , 5 - 8 , 7 0 , 0 2 7 , 7
y+s u b s i d i e s 3 5 9 4 3 - 0 , 4 + 0 , 5 - 9 8 , 0 0 , 0 - 6 1 , 6
y+n e tb e n e ﬁ t 3 4 2 2 5 - 2 , 1 5 + 5 , 2 - 4 2 , 3 0 , 1 - 6 , 0
Source: own elaboration on SHIW data, sub-sample of recipients.
As it was expected, the results are similar to those reported for the Italian population,
although enlarged26.A b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e s e r e s u l t s c a n b e m a d e b y m e a n s o f t h e
following concentration and Lorenz curves:
25We highlighted the possible reasons for this diﬀerence in the results in the introduction.
26Given that the concentration index of the gross beneﬁt in table 5 is positive but close to zero, the transfer is
substantially well-distributed across the various percentiles. Hence, the results for the sub-sample of user should
not change signiﬁcantly but in magnitude.
13Figure 6. Concentration curves and Lorenz curve of the equivalent
disposable income.


















Source: Own elaboration on SHIW data.
Figure 6 shows the concentration curves of the gross beneﬁt, fees, subsidies and net beneﬁt.
The Lorenz curve of the disposable income is also displayed (the starting income distribution).
The gross beneﬁt has a concentration curve that is under the 45 degrees line, which indicates a
pro-rich beneﬁt. Nevertheless, this curve is close to the 45 degrees line indicating a substantially
well-distributed transfer27. The small regressive impact of the tuition fees is represented by the
dominance of the fees concentration curve with respect the disposable income Lorenz curve (the
Jakobsson-Fellman-Kakwani theorem). The high progressivity of subsidies is instead proved by
the concavity of the their concentration curve. When subsidies and fees are considered, the net
beneﬁt becomes slightly pro-poor. It is worth noting that the “middle class” is the one that gains
the most from the actual system of subsidies and beneﬁts.
Regarding the Reynolds-Smolensky decomposition for the sub-sample of households that use
the service (table 5), it is worth noting that the re-ranking measures are almost zero. Thus,
we can focus on the two measures of progressivity and incidence without misunderstandings28.
The progressivity measure – the Kakwani index – of the gross beneﬁt is just 30.8%. To produce
ar e d u c t i o ni nt h eG i n ii n d e xo fa l m o s t2p o i n t sw et h e nh a v et ol o o ka tt h ei n c i d e n c et h a t
27This information is summarised by a slightly positive concentration index.
28The Reynolds-Smolensky index is deﬁned as follows:
RS = Gy − Gy−t = a
1−a(Ct − Gy) − (Gy−t − Cy−t)
= 1
1−a(Kakwani) − (reranking)
Hence, the incidence factor (with a<0 for taxes and a>0 for subsidies) multiplies the progressivity factor
(negative or positive) so that the sign is always deﬁned by the progressivity measure (the Kakwani index) whenever
the re-ranking is zero.
14is relatively high (+6.1). This result is important because it is a property of every in-kind
beneﬁt with universalistic features. Indeed, as in our case, the gross beneﬁt is substantially
well-distributed among the various percentiles. Hence, any possible redistributive eﬀect has to
be imputed to the incidence with respect to the income29.
As regards to the eﬀect of subsidies, we notice that the progressivity is close to 100%. Nev-
ertheless, their redistributive impact is very low and the reason can be found in their almost
negligible incidence. Fees and other taxes have a small regressive impact driven by the progres-
sivity factor (which is negative). Overall, the net beneﬁt is slightly more redistributive than the
gross one.
The ﬁgure below, which presents the average net and gross beneﬁt for each percentile of
equivalent disposable income, helps to better understand the diﬀerences between them and,
therefore, the eﬀect of taxes and subsidies:
Figure 7. Monetary value before and after fees and subsidies to
students for each decile of equivalent income.
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Source: own elaboration on SHIW data, sub-sample of users
On average, the gross beneﬁt increases with disposable income so that the relationship be-
tween income and beneﬁt is clearly positive. Once the subsidies and fees are considered, a rotation
around the third decile is observed. In other words, the ﬁrst two deciles are net winners thanks
to the joint action of (relatively) low fees and high subsidies, while, with the increase of income,
those deciles after the third witness a progressive loss. It is important to stress that the position
of the middle class (third-ﬁfth deciles) is essentially unchanged after the action of subsidies and
taxes. This means that the middle class is the real winner, as it gains from the subsidies while
29Hence, theoretically, it would be enough raising the expenditures for this service to increase its distributive
impact. The reason of this phenomenon lays in the (substantial) independence between income and beneﬁt, which
is actually driven by the universalistic feature of the service. In other words, a universalistic beneﬁt implies the
same money transferred to low-income and wealthy people. This leads to a redistributive eﬀect since the incidence
of a given sum of money on low incomes is higher than the incidence on high incomes.
15slightly losing in taxes so that it eventually has a pure gain from the gross beneﬁt.
Importantly, for the ﬁrst two deciles to be the winners, a more progressive system of fees is
needed. Indeed, even though people in the ﬁrst two deciles gain from the system of subsidies,
the regressivity of fees makes them net losers. This point can be better explored by means of
the following graph, which shows - for each decile of equivalent income - the average fee in the
left hand side axis and the average incidence in the right hand side axis:
Figure 8. Average amount and incidence of fees for each decile of equivalent
income

















Source: Own elaboration on SHIW data
As it can be seen, while the average tax is increasing with higher income, its average incidence
is decreasing. In other words, the fees grow at a smaller rate with respect to the growth rate of
income, producing the regressivity we observe in the data. This can depend on several factors.
Firstly, even though fees are structured as a function of income, they always contain a ﬁxed
element (which corresponds to the enrolment fee, other administrative fees and the “tax for
the right of studying”). Secondly, the income distribution of the households that demand the
university services, is only partially known to the university administration30.F i n a l l y ,i tm i g h t
be that universities want to keep the maximum fee relatively low.
8 A new system of fees
University fees are relatively recent for the Italian university system. They have been introduced
in the 1993 as a ﬂat rate fee. In 1997 a new legal measure stated that fees could vary among
universities and even among courses and faculties within the same university31. The same law
also stated that the new system of fees has to respect two fundamental criteria; the overall
30The Italian law makes it diﬃcult for a university to verify the reliability of the income statements presented
by students.
31See, d.p.r. 25 luglio 1997, art. 2 comma 1 e 2; art. 3 comma 1; art. 5 comma 1.
16equality and the maximum amount of fees that students has to pay. In particular, the new
rules stated that the fees have to be progressive and deﬁned according to the users’ economic
condition. Moreover, the revenues from the fees cannot exceed the 20% of the FFO transfer.
The aim of these constraints is clearly to avoid fees set too high and to guarantee a system of
payment that is overall proportionate.
There can be several reasons to propose a new system of fees for the Italian university system.
After the 1997 law, each university has adopted its own system of fees and has exploit new strate-
gies to obtain more funds from the students32.A sar e s u l t ,f e e sh a v eb e e np r o g r e s s i v e l yr i s i n g
in a very university-speciﬁc manner, which reduces the possibility of monitoring the dynamics of
the whole system. Moreover, as we have seen in the previous analysis, since universities do not
know the complete distribution of income of the users and do not want to set too high marginal
taxes, the overall tax-policy of each university may create an unequal system at the aggregate
level.
For these reasons might be important to re-deﬁne the rules for the university fees in order to
achieve the progressivity requested by the Italian law and to produce a more homogeneous and
fair system of payment.
Here we propose a fees function that is unique all over the Italian public universities. We
deﬁne a ﬂat-rate tax with a marginal tax of 3.8% and a deduction of €8000. If there are more
students in the same household, another deduction of €1000 for each student other than the ﬁrst
is applied. The maximum payable amount is €5000. The economic condition is computed using
the ISEE. The actual tax for the right of studying is added to the so computed fee. Importantly,
the marginal tax has been deﬁned in order to produce the observed amount of actual revenues.
The next table compares the proposed system of fees with the actual system:
Table 6. The distributive eﬀect of the fees system (recipient sub-sample).
Variabile Gini RS RS decomposition(*100) Conc.
Equivalent disposable income (y) 36.38 Inc. Prog. Rer.
y-f e e sa n dt a x e s 3 6 . 5 1 + 0 , 9 -1,5 -8,7 0,0 27,7
y-p r o p o s e df e e sa n dt a x e s 3 6 . 1 4 - 0 , 2 3 -1,5 16,2 0,0 52,6
Source: Own elaboration on SHIW data
As results show, the proposed system is now redistributive, decreasing the Gini index of 0.23.
The decomposition of the global redistributive eﬀect shows that the only diﬀerence between the
two systems lays with the progressivity component. This result was expected, since the marginal
tax has been adjusted in order to produce the same volume of revenues. Importantly, if we
focus on the concentration index it can be seen that most of the revenues now come from the
richest deciles. The next graph shows the concentration curves of the various components of
the university transfer. The new net-transfer concentration curve - deﬁned according to the
proposed fees system - lays over the previous one, meaning that the overall beneﬁt is now more
32An example is the “contributo di facolta”’, a fee whose amount depends on the speciﬁc department.
17progressive33.
Figure 9. Concentration curves and Lorenz curve of the equivalent
disposable income.




















Source: Own elaboration on SHIW data.
The next graph allows a deeper comparison between the actual system and the proposed one.
The left and the right vertical axis measure the average fee and the incidence of fees for each
decile of net income respectively:
Figure 10. Average amount and incidence of fees for each
deciles of equivalent income.


















Source: Own elaboration on SHIW data, recipients sub-sample.
33The new fees concentration curve is now under the Lorenz curve of the net income. According to the Jakobsson-
Fellman-Kakwani theorem this guarantee a progressive system of fees.
18As it can be seen, the average fee is increasing for both systems. Nevertheless, the average
fee in the proposed system is on average lower than the actual one up to the eight decile. For
the 9th and 10th deciles the new average fee is signiﬁcantly higher. In particular, the last decile
is the one that has the highest increment, the average fee going from €500 to €950. Moreover
- diﬀerently from the present situation - the average incidence in each decile is increasing. This
indicates that the new tax lays heavier on richer households.
The next graph shows the variation in the average incidence according to the main activity
of the householder:
Figure 11. Variation of the average incidence once the new system is
applied.
Source: Own elaboration on SHIW data, recipients sub-sample.
As it can be seen, the average incidence increases more for households where the householder
is self-employed, an executive or an entrepreneur. The real net winners from the proposed system
of fees are students from households where the householder is either unemployed, a blue collar
worker, a teacher or an oﬃce worker.
9 Conclusions
This paper has presented a microsimulation model for the university sector that is able to account
for the distributive eﬀects of subsidies and tuition fees. Simple tests have shown that the model
is able to well reproduce the observed distribution of fees and subsidies, even though the lack of
data needed to reproduce the subsidy and the fees functions put hurdles on the construction of
the simulators, requiring the deﬁnition of assumptions when the information was not available.
The distributive analysis has shown that higher education services have a small redistributive
eﬀect, which mainly depends on the incidence component rather than on its progressivity. This
means that the higher education beneﬁt is well-distributed across the whole population instead
of being focused only on wealthy households.
19Subsidies for scholarships and other services for low-income students are signiﬁcantly progres-
sive although the funds they receive are not enough to produce any real eﬀect. Fees and other
taxes seem to have a slightly regressive impact since they grow at a smaller rate with respect to
the growth of disposable income.
An e ws y s t e mo ff e e si sp r o p o s e dt oo v e r c o m et h er e g r e s s i v ei m p a c to ft h ep r e s e n ts y s t e m .
The new fee function is based on a ﬂat rate scheme and a system of deductions. The new system
is now progressive and reduces the fee burden for low-income households. Much work has to be
done to truly understand the distributive impact of fees, scholarships and of the distribution of
the public expenditures for higher education. Future works could introduce behavioural reactions
so as to simulate how students react when the university tax-beneﬁt system is changed.
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21Appendix
Results from median regression:
Number of obs = 803
Pseudo R2 = 0.6
unitras Coef. Std Err. T P>t
Nord 14.71 1.87 7.85 0.00
Nord-Est 9.46 1.92 4.94 0.00
Middle -3.01 1.77 -1.71 0.09
Sud -9.96 1.71 -5.84 0.00
Nstud=2 54.43 1.14 47.97 0.00
Nstud=3 91 3.16 28.83 0.00
ise2 -0.79 1.38 -0.57 0.57
ise3 -1.77 1.94 -0.91 0.36
ise4 3.99 2.3 1.73 0.08
ise5 6.57 2.65 2.48 0.01
ise6 -9.88 3.76 -2.63 0.01
ise7 3.41 3.78 0.9 0.37
ise8 -4.68 4.38 -1.07 0.29
ise9 6.9 4.58 1.51 0.13
ise10 2.65 3.14 0.84 0.40
sex 1.84 1.01 1.82 0.07
Age -0.47 0.2 -2.36 0.02
MarkHS 0.1 4.17 0.02 0.98
YearHS -0.39 0.22 -1.74 0.08
liceo 0.23 1.06 0.22 0.83
_cons 841 446.1 1.89 0.06
Note: dependent variable divided by 1000; MarkHS=high school
ﬁnal examination mark; YearHS=year of High School gradua-
tion; Liceo=1 if High school was a liceo; Ise1..Ise10 are dum-
mies for the class of Income; Nord, Nord-est, Middle and Sud
are dummies for the area of residence; Nstud=2 and Nstud=3
are dummies for the number of students who attend a university
degree.
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